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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
THE RED "STAR" CHAMBER
Blackstone, in his old-fashioned way, believed that a trial was "the examination
of the matter of fact in issue." 3 BL. COMM. *330. He thought that a trial must
have some element of contest. This was said, however, at
A Speedy and
a time when it was still believed that the law existed to
Public Trial
serve men, and that it was not solely a weapon in the
hands of the ruling class to safeguard its interests. He was
probably also influenced by the proverbial old English sporting instinct which
allegedly thrives on opposition. Today, however, while the Soviet plan for an
ouster of the bourgeois concepts of law has not been notably successful in the
course which it originally charted [Gsovski, The Soviet Concept of Law (1938) 7
FORDiEAm L. REv. 1] it has, nonetheless, achieved amazing success in a branch of
the law which it apparently never intended to transform, i.e., trial procedure. It
seems to have eliminated the element of contest entirely from the recent Moscow
treason trials by the simple method of securing confessions from all defendants.
From the point of view of the true pragmatist, the great weakness in Blackstone's
definition of a trial lies in its emphasis on an "issue". Issues are confusing things
at best, and the settling of them consumes much time,
A Step
money and energy. And yet, very often when they are
Forward
ostensibly settled, the pangs of doubt persist in gnawing at
the breast of the settlor. They are a stumbling block in the
path of the efficient administration of justice. It is not, therefore, difficult to understand why the admiration of certain circles of the legal world, addicted to speed and
economy, has been excited in recent months by the smoothness with which procedure operates in the courts of the U. S. S. R. [Cf. Pound, Individualization of
Justice, supra p. 164, wherein speed, which is also used as an argument for administrative law, is considered as possessing defects of its own] The adjective law of the
Soviet Union has fully justified the glowing hope that it would accomplish the
maximum political effect on the work of the courts, and at the same time constitute
a safeguard against mistake. See Hazard, Soviet Law: An Introduction (1936) 36
COL. L. REv. 1236, 1260-1261. If there is one thing which is outstanding about
the great Soviet trials, it is the absence of mistake. The high percentage of accuracy can only be attributed to the fact that Soviet jurists have gone to the roots
of the difficulty in more unsophisticated jurisdictions, and have trimmed down
that old chassis "issues" into the streamlined 20th century model. There is, for example, before the actual trial takes place a dress rehearsal, in which an investigator
gathers together the evidence and the actors run through their lines. The defense
is spared the annoyance of seeking its evidence, for the kindly investigator collects
the evidence for both sides. Hazard, supra, 36 COL. L. REv. at 1261. The defendant
is informed of the case against him. He confesses. The result of this is that no
new evidence appears on the trial which will make it impossible for the court to
proceed. Indeed, one of the apologists for the Moscow trials explains that the
prevalence of confessions is due to this system of letting the accused know what
the case is against him beforehand. PrTT, AT THE Moscow TRIAL (1937) 6-7.
*BIRrELL, OBiTER DICTA (1885) title page.
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The trial begins. The indictment is read. That of the latest trials, which is
representative of all Soviet indictments, constituted a resume of the confessions of
the accused coupled with a running commentary to give the
True
trial a theme. N. Y. Times, Mar. 3, 193S, p. 14, col 1-3.
Happy factory workers throng the court; there are sandConfessions
wiches and beer for foreign diplomats and correspondents
in a nearby room. Gusts of humor sweep through the baby-blue tinted courtroom.
Denny, Trial in Moscow a Strange Picture, N. Y. Times, Mfar. 6, 1938, § B, p. S,
col. 7. Defendant follows defendant, relating hair-raising testimony in the most
matter of fact tones. Since, under the Soviet law, confessions are not to be trusted,
because it is sometimes found that a defendant may lie to shield others [Hazard,
supra, 36 COL. L. Rnv. at 1262], it becomes necessary for all defendants, in addition
to implicating the unseen defendant, Trotsky, to incriminate all the other defendants,
so that no man will be convicted on the strength of his own confession.
Another improvement is the consequent removal of the strain under which a
defense attorney operates in bourgeois countries. In addition to being spared the
task of collecting the evidence at the preliminary hearing,
The Defense
during the trial itself he taxes neither the court's time, nor
his own throat, by thundering objections. This would serve
Rests
only to drag a red herring in the form of an issue across
the judicial trail. An observer at the latest trial reports that the defense attorneys
"'have not opened their mouths except to yawn or take glasses of water" [Denny,
supra]-a welcome innovation in the interest of speed and efficiency. Their sole
function, according to the same source, is to make pleas of extenuating circumstances for their guilty clients. An added factor in trials of this magnitude is the
presence of a spare judge, possibly to officiate in the event that one of the other
judges, swept away by the prevailing mood, himself confesses.
Thus it is that the Soviets have introduced an entirely new concept of jurisprudence-the trial without an issue. The aforementioned apologist for the recent
frials limited his perspective, however, to those who know they are guilty. What
of those who doubt their own guilt, or who even believe themselves to be innocent?
Certainly these people deserve some mention. It would seem that a true servant
of the working class, even knowing himself innocent, should plead guilty and confess in the interests of time, economy and good government.
Herein lies the key to a higher form of society. If enough innocent people pleaded
guilty, not only would our courts operate more efficiently by eliminating the befogging influence of miserable issues, but the increase in
De 4inhris non death sentences might, of its own momentum, rid us of
curat Lex
our terrible problem of unemployment. The Soviet Union,
by a mere transformation of our outmoded concept of a
"trial, has rendered us a great legal and sociological service.
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At early common law, because of their base nature, dogs were not considered
articles of property. Yet when they began to assume an important role in aiding
and comforting humans, we find the law readjusting its prior position. Dogs could
be included within the class of property protected by larceny statutes. Mullaly v.
New York, 86 N. Y.-365 (1881). At the present time the care of ferac dornesticae
has reached great proportions. No longer do these household members have to be
content with the crumbs from the table; now solicitous merchants have prepared
foods which are dietetically sound, dependent upon the age and habits of the consumers. Medicinal and tonsorial ministrations are de rigeur in all the better
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kennels. In cemeteries, monumental art perpetuates the fine qualities of the universal
Fido.
In line with this tendency was a newspaper report emanating from Chicago. It
seems that "Pet", a ten year old Spitz, is sole beneficiary of a $30,000 testamentary
trust. An aged spinster, the testatrix, was alleged to be inA Dog's
competent by two cousins who sought to void her will.
Life
Circuit Judge Burke upheld the will in the absence of satisfactory evidence of the incompetency. By the will's stipulations the trustee is to select a woman whose home must be childless as the custodian
of "Pet". She must guard and nourish "Pet" on the income derived from the fund.
Further, upon the dog's death, the principal sum is to go to the Anti-Cruelty Society.
Chicago Daily Times, February 24, 1938, p. 1, col. 4.
In New York a trust established for the benefit of, and limited on the lives of
five animals and one human being was declared void, since it suspended the ownership of personal property for more than two lives in being.
Cases "On
burrogate Wingate left the question open as to a limitation
All Fours"
on the lives of two domestic animals, but said, "It is probable, however, in view of the phraseology of subdivision 3
of section 96 of the Real Property Law, referring to 'use of any person? that such
result would be unavoidable even were two, only, in existence at testatrix' death."
In re Howells' Estate, 145 Misc. 557, 565, 260 N. Y. Supp. 598, 606 (Surr. Ct.
1932). Yet, an English case upheld a trust for animals, declaring that such trusts
are not illegal merely because brutes and not humans are the beneficiaries, providing
the trust did not last too long. In re Dean, 41 Ch. Div. 552 (1889). As to this
point of the length of the trust for animals, an Irish case cited in In re Howells'
Estate took the view that with reference to perpetuities, "lives" means human lives,
not those of animals. When pressed with the suggestion that the dogs in question
could not outlive the testator by 21 years, a touch of humor tempered the court's
reply: "In point of fact neighbour's dogs and cats are unpleasantly long-lived; but
I have no knowledge of their precise expectation of life." The court made it apparent that such a trust must be measured by human lives. Re Kelly, Cleary v.
Dillon [1932] Ir. R. 255, 261.
Authority is found holding that a trust for an animal or an inanimate object may
not be upheld as a private trust since the cestui is obviously devoid of legal personality. An attempt to include such a trust in the charitable
Poodles and
class is criticised by Bogert " . . . the difficulty with calling
Perpetuities
a trust for 'my dog, Dick', charitable is not that the dog
in question is a definite animal. . . . The result of caring
for Dick in comfort for the rest of his life is not an appreciable elevation in the
character and disposition of any considerable number of mankind." 2 BoGERT,
TRusTs (1935) § 379. In accord, another commentator is authority for denying
the validity of a trust for an animal. "No animal can be the owner of property,

even through the medium of a human trustee."

SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE

(9th ed.

1937) 419.
So it seems safe to say that the trust for "Pet" would not be upheld by the
foregoing authorities. The implication is that the statutes on trusts are creatures
of the legal mind, and hence would not be stretched even to the advantage of
potential four-legged plutocrats.

